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Global Property Rights in Genetic Resources:  
An Economic Assessment 
 
Abstract  
In recent years, growing economic globalisation has been accompanied by rising 
social support for market systems as a means of managing resource-use. In turn, the 
free market movement considers definite and secure property rights (especially 
private rights and, sometimes, communal rights) in resources to be the necessary basis 
for a desirable market system. Global policies for managing the Earth’s genetic 
resources have been influenced by this approach. As outlined in this article, there has 
been a global expansion of property rights in genetic resources, and further extensions 
have been advocated. In order to assess the possible social benefits and costs of 
granting property rights in genetic resources, they are classified. This classification is 
shown to be useful in discussing economic and legal reasons for granting or denying 
property rights in genetic resources. Furthermore, it is shown to be pertinent to the 
consideration of market failures that may accompany the granting of property rights in 
genetic resources and which limit the potential social economic benefits from 
establishing property rights in these resources. It is concluded that many advocates of 
managing genetic resources by means of secure property rights and market systems 
have been overly optimistic about the potential of this policy, its social benefits, its 
impact on the conservation of biodiversity, and its workability. There is a need for 
more informed debate on these matters before concluding that wholesale global 
extension of property rights in genetic material is desirable. 
 
  
Global Property Rights in Genetic Resources:  
An Economic Assessment 
 
1. Introduction  
Liberal economic philosophy, involving the use of market systems and private 
property rights, in recent times, has come to dominate thinking about economic policy 
globally. As a result, there has been growing support for the global creation of (or 
recognition of) private property rights and communal property rights in genetic 
resources (Bhat, 1999; Swanson, 1997) and for these resources to be managed by 
market operations rather than by government regulation, as an alternative, in some 
cases, to global open-access to these resources. 
 
Advocates of this policy foresee several advantages for it compared to previous 
policies. They consider that such an approach is likely to be more effective in 
conserving genetic resources, will be more efficient in the utilization of such 
resources, and that it will strongly encourage ‘improvements’ in the genetic resource 
base, for example, the development of new plant varieties and new breeds of 
livestock. In addition, some argue that this approach will promote distributive justice 
by ensuring that a larger share of the economic returns or rents from the use of genetic 
resources will flow to the guardians or developers of these. 
 
The matter is, however, quite complex. There is a danger that such policies may be 
‘oversold’. In several circumstances, such policies can prove to be less supportive of 
the conservation of biodiversity and less efficient in managing genetic resources than 
claimed by their supporters because of inescapable market failures. Furthermore, in 
some instances, their fairness is open to question (cf. Jugale, 2001). The purpose of 
this essay is to provide a preliminary assessment of these matters. 
 
This is done by first noting some changes in the nature of international policies 
governing economic rights in genetic resources and considering how these might be 
related to a classification of natural assets. Then a variety of reasons for favouring 
private or communal property rights in genetic resources are outlined and these are 
compared with reasons sometimes given in support of intellectual property rights, 
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such as those granted by patents. The penultimate section of this essay explores how 
market failures may undermine (at least, in some cases) the reason given for favouring 
property rights in genetic material and the final section concludes. 
 
2. Global Development in Legal Rights in Genetic Material  
Globally there is now much greater legal recognition of property rights in genetic 
resources than in the middle of the 20th century. 
 
Developments that have extended property rights in genetic material include the 
UPOV (Union international pour la Protection des Obtentions Vegetales) Convention. 
In English, this is the International Convention for the Protection of New Plant 
Varieties. This convention came into effect in 1961 and provides international 
property legal rights in new plant varieties (involving ‘improved’ genetic material) to 
plant breeders who develop these varieties and register these with the relevant 
authorities. These rights are recognised in nations that are signatories to the UPOV 
Convention.1
 
Originally, however, this approach was rejected by developing nations. They felt that 
it was economically unjust to them because germplasm was taken free of charge from 
developing countries, ‘improved’ in more developed countries to produce more 
desirable varieties of plants, and these in turn were liable to be sold back to 
developing countries at high prices and without recognising the benefit obtained by 
the developer as a result of using the original germplasm. 
 
“In 1986 this controversy resulted in the adoption of the International Undertaking on 
Plant Genetic Resources (IUPGR) in which the developing world agreed to recognise 
the legitimacy of the concept of plant breeders’ rights in return for the creation of a 
reciprocal concept termed ‘Farmer’s Rights’…These are rights granted in recognition 
of the contributions of farmers toward the conservation of genetic resources for use in 
the plant breeding and seed industries generally” (Swanson, 1997, p.102). While this 
has been internationally agreed in principle, and the possibility of a body such as the 
FAO collecting funds for farmers and distributing these to relevant nations and for 
these nations to distribute these in turn to farmers has been aired, this agreement has 
not yet been implemented (Swanson, 1997, p.102). With international property rights 
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in genetically modified organisms (GMOs) legally recognised, developing countries 
have also expressed additional concerns about lack of rents from genetically modified 
crops such as GM soya beans (Xie et al., 2004). In fact, GMOs can be given patent 
protection. 
 
Jugale (2005) outlines legislation that has been passed in India to protect farmers’ 
rights in genetic material. He argues that the UPOV Convention is unfavourable to 
less developed countries and is concerned about the Trade Related Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPs) agreement which requires all WTO members to legislate to 
protect new plant varieties. 
 
In no jurisdictions are property rights granted in naturally occurring organisms. 
Currently, exclusive marketing rights are only granted when “it is demonstrated that 
human intervention has produced an organism that was not previously existing in 
nature” (Swanson, 1997, p.103). However, the Convention on Biological Diversity 
which came into effect in the 1990s opens the way for the granting of national 
property rights in naturally occurring genetic resources. Swanson (1997, p.105) argues 
strongly in favour of the granting of property rights in naturally occurring genetic 
material. 
 
He believes that bias in the legal system has undermined the conservation of natural 
genetic stocks. He states: “In essence, the legal system has contrived to treat the 
informational products of nature as ‘open access’. And thus the only appropriable 
genetic information is that which results from human intervention. Again, such a bias 
actively discourages any investment in the maintenance of the stocks of natural 
genetic capital, instead of encouraging the development of capital stocks that are 
compatible with the international property rights structure” (Swanson, 1997, p.105). 
 
Swanson (1997) is also of the view that property rights regimes and greater 
international trade in wildlife and their products (the products of natural genetic 
material) are likely to be more supportive of wildlife conservation than restrictions on 
such trade, as exemplified in the Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species (CITES). His attitude has been influenced by his joint study of bans on trade 
in ivory (Barbier et al., 1990). The Convention on Biological Diversity, in contrast 
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and to some extent in conflict with CITES, appears to be supportive of the type of 
approach recommended by Swanson (1997). However, as Tisdell (in press) points out, 
Swanson’s preferred approach is only likely to be effective in conserving some 
wildlife species. Globally, many economically valued species (for example, those 
with high non-use economic values) would disappear under such an approach unless 
conserved in protected areas. Unfortunately, due to market failures (missing markets 
or partial markets), private and communal property rights regimes combined with 
marketing of genetic materials and natural products does not in itself result in a 
socially optimal outcome. 
 
3. Classification of Genetic Material and Related Property Rights 
Private and communal property rights in genetic resources are in a state of flux. In 
general, property rights have only been firmly assigned to legal entities able to show 
that they have developed organisms that do not occur in nature. However, such rights 
have been agreed in principle for farmers who have communally or over long periods 
of time evolved organisms that would not have evolved without their intervention or 
which would not have been conserved without their intervention. Nevertheless, a 
similar funding mechanism has not, it seems, been considered for hunters and 
gatherers who may also have, in a somewhat similar manner, conserved or even to a 
limited extent developed genetic material. In principle, however, the Convention on 
Biological Diversity would make such an approach possible.  
 
Nations are increasingly claiming global property rights in indigenous genetic 
material. However, these rights cannot be enforced retrospectively, but could be 
enforced in relation to future global use of indigenous genetic material not previously 
known to be useful and still contained within a country’s borders.2
 
In order to envisage the type of property rights that have been or could be granted in 
genetic resources, it is useful to classify these resources in a systematic manner. This 
is done in Figure 1. As a first approximation, genetic resources or assets may be 
divided into those that produce organisms that occur naturally (Set A) and those that 
produce organisms that have not evolved naturally but are the product of human 
intervention in natural processes (Set B).3 The latter (Set B) can be further subdivided 
into organisms that have evolved, often by co-evolution and communal activities, as a 
4 
result of efforts of several generations of human beings. Designate this as set C. 
Farmers’ rights are being sought for genetic material in this set. Set D covers new 
organisms that have been produced in modern times by legal entities manipulating or 
selecting genetic material to produce organisms that previously did not exist. A legal 
entity is able to obtain legal rights in such genetic material via plant variety rights or 
patents, for example, for GMOs, depending on the nature of the genetic change. 
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Figure 1 A classification of the stock of genetic resources and associated regimes of 
property rights in genetic resources. 
 
Currently, global property rights are biased in favour of set D, the areas in which more 
developed nations have the lead. Farmers’ rights have not yet been supported 
effectively. Legal entities or social groups have not yet been granted legal rights in the 
genetic material contained in natural organisms but several nations now claim such 
rights, an outcome supported by the Convention on Biological Diversity. Thus, it is 
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clear currently that property rights in genetic material are patchy and show bias in 
favour of Set D in Figure 1. It is therefore useful to consider why this bias may exist 
and the reason often given to justify property rights in genetic resources. 
 
4.  Reasons for Granting or Denying Property Rights in Genetic Resources 
Legal views about the granting of property rights in genetic resources appear to have 
been strongly influenced by earlier practices in relation to intellectual property, 
particularly patents. Patents provide a legal monopoly in a new invention to the 
patent-holder for several years. 
 
A variety of arguments have been advanced in favour of patent systems (Tisdell, 
1972, Ch.20). These include the following: (1) These systems provide an economic 
incentive for advances in applied intellectual knowledge and hence promote economic 
growth; (2) They provide a reward for effort in research and development. In the eyes 
of some, this is just. The granting of property rights in genetic material in category D, 
in Figure 1 satisfies these considerations.4
 
The main rationale for giving property rights for genetic stock in category C is not so 
much that it will lead to further advances in intellectual knowledge but that it would 
reward past efforts and may encourage the conservation of this genetic material. 
However, this raises the question of for how long such property rights should be 
granted. If they are granted in perpetuity, this would differ from the practice adopted 
in relation to the granting of property rights in category D. These rights are only 
granted for a finite period of time. 
 
In relation to the granting of property rights to local communities or national 
governments for genetic material in category A, the reasons cannot be that it is an 
economic reward for adding to intellectual capital. A possible rationale, however, is 
that it is an economic reward or incentive for conserving natural capital (compare 
Swanson, 1997). However, in many cases, payments arising as a result of such rights 
would constitute a rent because some or much of the pool of natural genetic resources 
may be conserved incidentally rather than consciously.  
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Thus, it is clear that different economic reasons need to be advanced to support the 
granting of property rights in different types of genetic resources. 
 
Given the degree of support globally for property rights regimes and the use of 
markets, the question needs to be asked of how effective this approach is likely to be 
in conserving biodiversity and to what extent the possible economic benefits of this 
approach are likely to be limited by market failures. Let us consider this matter. 
 
5.   Market Failures Restrict Social Benefits from Property Rights in Genetic 
Resources 
The potential for using patent systems and property rights in genetic resources to 
provide social benefits is limited by a number of market failures. The operation of 
such systems rely on those who are granted property rights being able to appropriate a 
significant proportion of economic benefits from the genetic resources involved. 
 
The ability of holders of property rights in genetic material to appropriate economic 
benefit is likely to be greatest when use value constitutes a high proportion of the total 
economic value of such material, that is, when private goods are mainly produced by 
such material. Conversely, other things equal, the higher is non-use value as a 
proportion of the total economic value of genetic material, the less is the ability of 
economic entities to appropriate economic benefits from it. In such cases, a high 
public good element is present. 
 
Thus, the property rights method in genetic material is likely to favour private goods 
in comparison to goods with high public good component. 
 
Secondly, the granting of property rights in genetic material usually takes no account 
of any externalities generated. For example, the granting of patent rights in a GMO or 
property rights in a new plant variety depends merely on whether the GMO or new 
plant variety constitutes a novel organism. The body granting such rights does not 
take account of any externalities that might be generated by its use. It is usually the 
function of other public bodies to take account of possible adverse environmental 
externalities from new organisms and limit their use if necessary. Fears exist that such 
screening processes may prove to be inadequate and could result in new organisms 
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being used which yield high private economic returns to business but generate 
significant adverse environmental externalities. For example, one such concern is that 
genetically engineered herbicide-resistant crops will give rise to herbicide-resistant 
weeds (Tisdell and Wilson, 2004). 
 
Market transactions usually involve costs and these can be quite high in the case of 
property rights in genetic material (Swanson and Göschl, 2000). This limits the scope 
for economically using market systems for determining economic activity, and this 
applies to their use for using and developing genetic resources. For example, the 
transaction costs involved in ensuring Farmers’ Rights might be so high that no 
economic benefit is received by farmers (see Tisdell, 2005, Ch.5). It may also be that 
the transaction costs involved in marketing genetic material and protecting private 
property rights in it favours very large corporations because economies of scale occur 
in transaction costs. Small firms are liable to be at a disadvantage in enforcing their 
property rights in genetic material. Therefore, a property right system for genetic 
material appears to be relatively more beneficial to big business compared to small 
firms, including farmers. 
 
It is also the case that such a system can reduce biodiversity. For example, genetic 
items in category D involve additions to the genetic stock, that is, they involve the 
creation of new organisms. However, if these are commercially successful organisms, 
they are liable to replace or displace existing organisms. Thus, the composition of the 
genetic stock alters. Both natural genetic diversity and existing genetic diversity due 
to human intervention could conceivably be reduced. There is a risk that 
commercially successful new organisms, such as some GMOs, could, as a result of 
their consequences, reduce rather than add to biodiversity. This is the fear of some 
conservationists, many of whom in turn are worried that this reduction in biodiversity 
might threaten economic sustainability. 
 
Even in cases where genetic property rights do not legally exist, for example, for 
wildlife, some economists, for example Swanson (1997), and conservation  groups 
(IUCN-UNEP-WWF, 1991) advocate the granting of property rights to local 
communities or individuals in harvested wildlife and greater international trade in this 
wildlife and its products. They favour the concept of conservation of wildlife by 
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means of sustainable use. If such a strategy is successful, it will also conserve the 
genetic material inherent in this wildlife. Tisdell (in press) argues that while such an 
approach can be effective in conserving some species, it will fail to do so for many, 
even when they have high economic value. Once again, the property rights approach, 
when combined with market guidance, is shown to be subject to failures. 
 
6.  Concluding Comments 
The new global policy approach favouring the granting of private, communal, or in 
some cases, national property rights in genetic resources is not likely to be as effective 
a policy for promoting conservation of biodiversity, overcoming failures in genetic 
resource use, and promoting sustainable economic growth, as its strongest advocates 
claim. Furthermore, this approach is limited in its capacity to ensure a just distribution 
of economic benefits from the conservation and development of genetic resources. 
 
It is important to be aware of such limitations because they have institutional 
implications. The main implication is that it is dangerous to entrust the conservation 
and development of genetic resources solely to the private sector. It is necessary for 
the public sector to play a significant role in the stewardship of genetic resources and 
the development of these resources. The exact role that the public sector should play 
needs investigation. A step towards this, taken here, is to demonstrate that the private 
sector cannot be expected to husband and develop genetic resources in an ideal 
manner because it is bound to exhibit predictable economic biases. 
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8. Notes 
1. The UPOV Convention was revised in 1972, 1978 and 1991. Its objective is to 
protect new varieties of plants by means of an international intellectual property 
rights in these. The 1991 revision allows for the granting of patent rights in new 
plant varieties. Jugale (in press) suggests that is very unfavourable to less 
developed countries.  
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2. Retrospective enforcement by a government of property rights in indigenous 
genetic material that has already been distributed internationally as a result of 
previous open access does not appear to be a legal possibility. Most nations now 
have obtained, as a result of open access, genetic material from many other nations 
without payment for using the genetic resources involved. For example, soya beans 
were introduced to the USA from Asia and maize was introduced from the 
Americas to most other countries of the world, including India. Similarly, the 
potato. The list of such introductions is in fact very long. To give an Australian 
example, the macadamia nut Macadamia intergrifolia is a native of southern 
Queensland. Although it is now cultivated in Australia, cultivation did not begin 
until 1963. Cultivation first commenced in the United States in Hawaii in the early 
1900s using seed exported from Australia (Low, 1991, p.92). No payment was 
made for access to this Australian genetic resource. The potential commercial 
value of the resource would have still been uncertain in the early 1900s and 
Australia has probably obtained reverse economic benefits from the development 
of macadamia nuts as a cultivated crop in Hawaii. 
3. In practice, it may be difficult to decide whether some organisms belong to set A or 
C. For example, the genetic composition of some wild species is altered by human 
activities. 
4. The economic benefit from greater technical or scientific progress as a result of the 
patent system have to be weighed against the social economic deadweight loss 
resulting from the grant of a monopoly in the invention for a specified period 
(Tisdell, 1972, Ch.20). Greater technical or scientific progress does not in itself 
provide sufficient justification for patent systems, and in particular for granting 
patents for GMOs (Tisdell and Wilson, 2004). 
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